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INTRODUCTION
BRINGING LEGAL REALISM TO THE STUDY
OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM
Douglas N. Frenkel
Robert L. Nelson
Austin Sarat
INTRODUCTION
W HILE claims of "crisis" in the legal profession had been heard
before, the early 1990s was an era of unprecedented public and
journalistic attention to the work of lawyers generally, and to prob-
lematic conduct and case outcomes in particular.1 Inside the profes-
sion, too, this period witnessed an explosion of concern over the
decline of civility, if not ethics, and the search for means a of remedy-
ing the situation.' At the same time, the legal profession, like the rest
of the commercial world around it, was reportedly confronted with
structural changes, including heightened competitive business pres-
sures, that have impacted the way in which services are delivered.
It was against this backdrop that the ABA Section of Litigation
launched Ethics: Beyond the Rules. Sensitive to claims of increased
incidents of litigator incivility and unethical conduct, the study sought
to gain a better understanding of the forces that shape the quality of
decision-making by litigators who are confronted with ethical
dilemmas.
I. OUR WORKING HYPOTHEsIs: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
We began the study with the premise that in the legal profession, as
elsewhere, ethical behavior and high levels of professionalism are va-
riable achievements. We assumed, as earlier writers had suggested,
that particular environments, structures, and incentives may en-
courage lawyers to behave in an ethically appropriate fashion, and
* Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association. All rights
reserved.
1. In the decade preceeding this study, for example, lawyers' lives and work were
showcased in the popular media of television (e.g., LA Law, Court TV, full-time law
correspondents on news programs) and published fiction (e.g., the novels of John
Grisham and Scott Turow). In print journalism, such newspapers as the American
Lawyer, National Law Journal, and Legal Tines were in their second decade of publi-
cation, while major newspapers began to devote regular columns to the law (e.g., the
New York Tunes "At the Bar" column by David Margolick).
2. See Committee on Civility, Seventh Fed. Jud. Cir., Final Report of the Com-
mittee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit (1992), reprinted in 143
F.R.D. 441 (1992).
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that other environments can send different signals.3 In this sense, pro-
fessionalism is a social product enacted and defined in the decision-
making and behavior of lawyers.
The major assumption of this project was that neither hortatory
professional ideologies nor the promulgation of rules themselves can
provide reliable protections against both incivility and overtly unethi-
cal behavior in litigation. Just as legal realists discovered a gap be-
tween law on the books and law in action4 and urged prudent
lawmakers to attend to the social factors that explained why the rules
were followed, this project sought to inject an element of realism into
the current discussion of professionalism.5
According to earlier research, the settings in which lawyers work
are among the most powerful, contextual factors shaping enactments
of professionalism. As Nelson and Trubek suggest: "[I]t is in the legal
workplace that we find real conflicts over how practice should be or-
ganized. It is there that the presence and power of professional ideol-
ogy often is least visible and least understood."6 According to this
view, the profession's workplaces can be understood in terms of the
extent to which they socialize their members concerning professional
norms and in terms of their role as agents of social control, policing
the behavior of their members.7 With these propositions in mind, Eth-
ics: Beyond the Rules chose to focus on litigators working in large
corporate law firms-professional organizations traditionally identi-
fied as being at the pinnacle of professional prestige and ethicality, but
which have seen several highly publicized ethical scandals in recent
years.8
It is widely recognized that the bar's demography has changed dra-
matically in the last three decades.9 A great numbers of lawyers now
3. David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Con-
text in Legal Ethics, in Everyday Practices and Trouble Cases 68, 71 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 1998).
4. See Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Actions, 27 Int'l J. Ethics 150
(1917).
5. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468,
469 (1990) (arguing that the traditional model of legal ethics is premised on formalist
assumptions about the constraining power of legal rules).
6. Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Profes-
sional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Trans-
formations in the American Legal Profession 177, 179 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992).
7. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L. Rev.
1, 6-11 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858
P.2d 1054, 1084-85 (Wash. 1993) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to sanc-
tion the defendant for discovery abuse where they failed to produce smoking gun
documents which fell within legitimate discovery requests).
9. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L.
Rev. 639, 664-65 (1981); Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statisti-
cal Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in the 1990s 1-14 (1994).
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work for someone other than themselves in increasingly large and bu-
reaucratic settings.'" This means that fewer lawyers have clients in the
traditional sense, and most of the work of corporate firms is seen only
by other lawyers. Lawyers in large firms work at the nexus of several
competing systems of normative regulation." Ethical strictures may
at times conflict with the pressures, incentives, and customs peculiar
to the large law firm. Fidelity to the codified norms of the profession
may not coincide with institutional objectives or strategies for profes-
sional advancement in an impersonal work environment.
Earlier writings suggest that as professional organizations increase
in size and complexity, patterns associated with a "punishment cen-
tered bureaucracy" become more apparent.12 Marc Galanter and
Thomas Palay predicted that, in the large firm, "the development of a
firm culture through social control and prospective monitoring will
play an active role in mitigating opportunistic conduct." 3 Prior re-
search had also posited that firm structures may have an immediate
impact on the behavior of lawyers in litigation. On the other hand,
research showed that in large, highly compartmentalized firms, there
is relatively little interaction between lawyers in different "castes" or
specialties. 4 Eliot Freidson's research on the medical profession sug-
gested that where compartmentalization is particularly strong, individ-
uals conduct themselves in accordance with the norms of their
segmented reference group. 5 Under such circumstances, lawyers, like
doctors, may have little knowledge of, or interest in, acts of or policies
concerning professionalism outside their immediate group, absent the
kind of gross and obvious deviance that threatens the partnership and
brings widespread, unfavorable publicity. We wanted to examine
these claims with a view toward determining whether solutions to
problems could be found at the organizational level.
We began this project sensing that, within the same firm, lawyering
and ethical concerns may be experienced differently by senior and
junior lawyers. As Galanter and Palay recognize, "the situation of the
junior lawyer is more precarious and more pressured."' 6 Given the
pressure to attain partnership, evaluation procedures, and promotion
patterns, associates and partners may occupy substantially different
10. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transfor-
mation of the Big Law Firm 1-3, 120 (1991).
11. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate LawYers?, 105 Harv. L Rev. 799,
817-27 (1992).
12. See Paul D. Montagna, Professionalization and Bureaucratization in Large
Professional Organizations, 74 Am. J. Soc. 138, 144 (1968) (citations omitted).
13. Galanter & Palay, supra note 10, at 120 (citations omitted).
14. See Ervin Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer Professional Organization Man?
195-96 (1964).
15. See Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Ap-
plied Knowledge 366-68 (1970).
16. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Transformation of the Big Law Firm, in
Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 6, at 31, 60.
1998] 699
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professional worlds and respond to substantially different professional
pressures in daily decision-making.
Finally, we were curious about the role that firm status-its history,
self-image, reputation, and financial stability-may play in condition-
ing the behavior of its members. There is at least anecdotal evidence
that some firms consciously cultivate a reputation for extreme aggres-
siveness and the most fanatic forms of zealous advocacy. 17 Such a rep-
utation may affect the firm's working climate as well as the kinds of
lawyers and cases it attracts. In such a firm one might expect to see
high tolerance for incivility and a take-no-prisoners professional style.
By contrast, where firm management feels financially and psychologi-
cally secure and, as a result, does not exert pressure to push the limits
of professionalism in the name of entrepreneurial needs, different
manners should prevail.
In a legal realist model, one expects that ethics and civility in litiga-
tion would also be responsive to structures of incentives and control
outside the firm. Here, three kinds of actors play key roles. First are
the clients-increasingly in the form of in-house counsel who are in
charge of managing litigation and retaining and supervising law firm
attorfneys on behalf of the businesses for which they work. 8 The sig-
nals they send, the demands they make, and the expectations they
communicate are likely to be very important in shaping behavior of
outside counsel in litigation. These effects are especially important in
an environment where clients may be less likely to have ongoing rela-
tions with one outside firm than in the past.
The second key actor outside the firm who shapes the conduct of
litigation is the judge. It is her role to supervise and control that con-
duct, interpreting rules and setting a tone about what kinds of behav-
ior are acceptable and what kinds are not. To the extent that judges
take a hands-off attitude, other incentives will prevail in shaping the
decisions lawyers make and the way they behave.
The third group of actors is the lawyers themselves, because their
conduct may be responsive to the behavior of their adversaries. In
this sense, litigation is social. Yet it is by no means clear how, when,
and where the behavior of an adversary sets a tone, and how that be-
havior interacts with any incentives and controls available in the cul-
ture of the firm, in the relationship with in-house counsel, and in the
expectations of judges. There was little doubt in our minds that a full
17. See Connie Bruck, Enemy of the Maimed: Is He 'Anti-Human'?, Am. Law.,
Sept. 1979, at 1, 21-23; Steve Weinberg, Hardball Discovery, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at
66.
18. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite
Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 277-78 (1985); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 Ind. L.J.
479, 506 (1989).
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account of the variations in ethics and civility in litigation would have
to account for these factors and that interaction.
Finally, litigation is, of course, a dynamic process. General styles of
practice, as well as incentive structures both inside and outside firms,
are filtered through the myriad factors that shape every case. Thus we
would expect differences in litigation behavior in different areas of law
and in cases with different stakes. Class-action, "bet-your-company"
cases should produce pressures that are different in degree and kind
from routine, smaller matters.
It is against this background-an effort to bring legal realism to the
study of legal ethics and to examine behavior in litigation-that Eth-
ics: Beyond The Rules was organized.
II. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION
Prompted by the concerns outlined above, the Litigation Section of
the American Bar Association enlisted the assistance of a team of
legal scholars, ethicists, and social scientists to examine the issue. The
initial phase of the study was organized around intensive weekend-
long discussion groups with selected groups of lawyers. Over two ex-
tended weekends we conducted separate sessions for partners and as-
sociates, respectively, from five leading firms in each of two major
cities.19 A total of ten partners and nine associates took part in the
weekends. Four of the partners and three of the associates were wo-
men. All participants were promised confidentiality and anonymity
outside of the discussion room. The sessions involved a combination
of group discussion techniques. Early sessions began with discussions
of short case studies based on real cases that raised questions about
litigation decisions, especially as to disclosure in discovery.2' Other
sessions asked the lawyers more directly to discuss questions about
their own firms and their own experiences. One-on-one interviews
were conducted with all participants at one weekend session. During
the other weekend, the group was divided into smaller discussion
groups for a portion of the program. All sessions were taped and
transcribed.
19. Prior to these two-city weekend sessions, we tested this "a 5yers talking" qual-
itative research format with seventeen ABA Section of Litigation volunteers. These
were almost all partners, roughly half male and half female, from all over the country.
The main discussion vehicle was a videotape entitled "Professional Responsibility in
Pretrial Litigation: The Morgantown Civic Center Collapse," produced by the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Center on Professionalism, which depicts a variety of classic
examples of "gaming" in pretrial discovery.
20. The major case study, used with all groups, was based on the events reported
in a Washington matter, Washington State Physicians Insurance Erchange & Ass'n v.
Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993). See Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 691, app. at 885-87 (1998) [hereinafter Report] (discussing Fisons
material used in our study).
1998]
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In almost all cases, the partners and associates from the two-cities
group were selected at random from lists of litigators who had been at
their firms for a minimum of three years. Some effort was made to
insure a gender balance within each group. The random selection pro-
cess within firms produced a set of partners that varied in age and
family circumstances.2 1
The second phase of the data collection, almost a year after the first
round, was based on discussions with separate groups of judges, plain-
tiffs' lawyers, and inside counsel in the same two cities in which we
conducted the first round. The goal was to examine the working hy-
pothesis concerning defense firm litigators by conducting similarly-
structured discussions with those professionals who most frequently
come into contact with, and potentially influenced, the conduct of
those previously studied defense lawyers. We used a similar format
for all the sessions. Each session began with a discussion of the same
case study as had been used with the defense lawyers22 and moved
through a series of topics concerning the participants' experiences in
the discovery process. In each city we spent one-half day with the
judges, one day with plaintiffs' lawyers, and one day with inside coun-
sel. The academic observers took turns leading the discussion and
posing questions. The sessions in one city were taped and transcribed.
In total, we talked to ten state or federal judges and magistrates,
sixteen plaintiffs' lawyers, and sixteen inside counsel in the two cities.
The judges and magistrates were selected in part for their experience
with management of civil cases. We selected well-known plaintiffs'
lawyers who had reputations as specialists in types of litigation that
would pit them against attorneys from large law firms, including secur-
ities, antitrust, employment, product liability, and medical malprac-
tice. Overall, the participants in this category were senior and
financially successful. Inside counsel were chosen positionally. We
first identified the corporations in each locale with significant law de-
partments, and then approached either the general counsel or senior
litigation counsel. Although these three groups were small and in no
way approximated random samples, we succeeded in gathering rather
diverse groups. 23 These extended conversations produced the data
from which each researcher produced an independent report and
analysis of what they heard.
21. The sample of large-firm lawyers we spoke with cannot be defended as repre-
sentative on statistical grounds and our conversations with them must be seen as pre-
liminary. But while their numbers are small, the nineteen randomly selected lawyers
in the two-city group, and, for that matter, the seventeen ABA volunteers in the
"test" run, seemed to represent a diversity of viewpoints and practices from within
leading firms.
22. See supra note 20.
23. As a group, the plaintiffs' lawyers were probably less diverse in status and
background than the judges or corporate counsel. They did, however, represent a
wide spectrum of substantive specialties.
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III. OVERVIEW OF OBSERVATIONS 2 4
The project Ethics: Beyond the Rules paints a canvas of the world
of large-firm litigation in the mid-1990s and presents the interpreta-
tion of those images by scholars who study professions. Each presents
a unique approach to this data, reflecting his own training and back-
ground and the different levels-of tone as well as content-on which
the lawyers' conversations could be heard. The five papers in this col-
lection, however, are remarkable in their consistency of description
and in the similarity of their observations. This reflects the overall
patterns exhibited in the talk of our groups of lawyer-subjects.
Themes that run through all of the papers can be summarized as
follows.
A. The Power of the Adversary Norm
To one degree or another, all of the researchers saw the problems in
this area as inseparable from the structural underpinning of the litiga-
tor's work-the adversary system and its expectation of partisan con-
duct amidst a neutral, amoral stance-the so-called "dominant" or
"standard" conception. They saw and heard the adversary norm as
alive and well, some opining that nothing short of basic structural
change will alter the climate of litigation.
In this world, information is marshaled competitively, competence
is paramount, and advantages in resources or ability are to be ex-
ploited in the name of honoring the primacy of the duty to favor one's
client. The greater the stakes, the harder the fight. Attention to the
functioning of the system or to the justice of outcomes is secondary at
best. Ethics is a matter of steering, if necessary, just clear of the few
unambiguous prohibitions found in rules governing lawyers, i.e., that
which is not unlawful is required if the client wants it.
B. Externalizing Blame for Problems and Bad Outcomes
Each group of lawyers sought to shift responsibility for systemic
problems onto others with whom they interact. Plaintiffs' lawyers at-
tacked the aggressive information withholding of defense counsel.
The latter pointed to their disloyal, unreasonable clients and to frivo-
lous, extortionate filings by, or incompetence of, plaintiffs' lawyers.
Corporate clients complain about the over-aggressiveness of both law-
yer groups, with everyone reactive in a system approximating a pris-
oner's dilemma. All blamed trial judges for failing to police the
system. They, in turn, blamed the participants' and appellate courts'
lack of support for tough sanctions. Researchers' reactions to this
ranged from seeing it as an extension of the adversary stance and its
24. The term "observation" seems preferable to "findings" in light of the
exploratory nature of this inquiry and the informality of the research methodology
employed.
1998]
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built-in conflict and contradictions, to the rhetoric of opponents in
what is essentially a political fight and a massive case of denial.
C. Heightened Market Competition and Resulting Insecurity
Each paper in this collection confirms the widespread perception
that large firms increasingly must compete for business and perform
efficiently in order to remain profitable in the face of budget limits set
by demanding clients. Firm-wide insecurity trickles down. Partners
worry more about billing and longer careers than before, while junior
lawyers are concerned most heavily with attaining partnership, as
their odds have become more remote in recent years.
D. Declining Relationships and Loyalties
Loyalties that once prevailed in large firm practice and which may
have served a host of behavior moderating functions, are disappear-
ing. Once-regular clients have been transformed in the persons of in-
house counsel, and are now transient purchasers of technical services.
Reduced firm loyalty to its most junior lawyers is accompanied by a
decline in the sentimental links25 of more senior members looking for
"exit" mobility26 as "lateral" ship-jumpers. Given the growth of the
bar and case filings, the "solitary bonds" that may have resulted from
repeated litigation against the same lawyers are weakening, as oppos-
ing lawyers are now seen as one-time adversaries.
E. The Weakness of Firm Culture
While the papers differ a bit, most portray the large law firm as
weak in terms of its role as a mode of ethics socialization or control.
Researchers point to the irrelevance of formal mechanisms to lawyers'
daily discretionary judgments,2 8 and the lack of connection between
ethicality and the reward system,2 9 with large-firm litigation essen-
tially an individual or small group activity. Clients hire lawyers, not
firms.
Moreover, there were strong indications that firm ideology is not
formally transmitted. The papers are uniform in citing decline in, or
absence of, such elements as formal training or mentoring of junior
25. See Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institu-
tional, Professional, and Socioeconomic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inef-
ficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 773, 787
(1998).
26. See Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics
in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 869 (1998).
27. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Prelimi-
nary Observations, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 709, 717-18 (1998).
28. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 789; Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism:
A Study of Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 809, 826-27 (1998).
29. See Suchman, supra note 26, at 860.
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lawyers in the area of ethical judgment.3' They point to a lack of hori-
zontal communication among lawyers, with partners unaware of,
much less policing, each other's work, and the increase in size and
geographic dispersal of firms coupled with stress occasioned by de-
mands of technology-based communications. All discuss the absorp-
tion of laterals from other firms as part of the declining stability and
increased "contamination" from heightened lawyer mobility, both in
joining and leaving the firm. Only in hiring did firms seem to have a
program aimed at promoting a coherent culture. If internal firm cul-
tures exist, they are probably confined to small departmental work
groups.
As evidence of this weakness, the papers uniformly describe the
widely divergent perceptions of senior and junior lawyers about the
climate in their firms and the prescription for addressing problems.
Each notes the contradictory messages inherent in firms' efforts to
cultivate two images simultaneously: tough "junkyard dogs" to attract
clients, but civil and ethical practitioners to please judges and recruit
law school graduates. The resulting void of guidance to junior lawyers
may well be filled by other powerful systemic or environmental influ-
ences, especially the conduct of lawyers from other firms with whom
associates interact. Culture can thus be seen as exogenous, 31 reflect-
ing or reinforcing the similarity of firms generally.
F. The Decline of the Counseling Function
The papers in this collection uniformly point to the supplanting of
outside lawyers by in-house counsel in terms of access to client deci-
sion makers. The structure and economics of the staffing of litigation
contributes to this, as partners are largely absent from the processing
of cases after their inception. With clients described as uninterested in
moral dialogue, and firms motivated to please clients, the relative au-
tonomy of the outside firm lawyer has declined, as her role shifts from
wise counselor to purveyor of technical services.
G. Pragmatism as Morality
All of the papers, using slightly different labels, note the discus-
sants' avoidance or suspicion of any moral calculus in their daily
choices. Decision-making was described as "situational" or prag-
30. This was consistent with the finding of one recent study of Chicago hiring part-
ners, in which approximately three-fourths of firms expected incoming lawyers to
bring with them "sensitivity to professional ethical concerns." Only twenty-five per-
cent indicated that this skill should be developed by the firm. See Bryant G. Garth &
Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Constnction of Competence, 43 J. Legal Educ.
469, 490 tbl.11 (1993).
31. See Suchman, supra note 26, at 868.
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matic,32 thinking "realistic" and instrumental,33 standards as external,
and ethical limits defined solely by rules. Several researchers pointed
to the lack of connection between daily adversarial work and the law-
yer's moral sense, with a moral sensitivity beyond the rules that is
more apparent in associates than partners.
H. Eroding Conditions for the Exercise of Judgment
By increasingly working alone with little monitoring in face of effi-
ciency, technology, and overall work volume pressures, the conditions
under which lawyers-especially junior lawyers doing the bulk of ini-
tial rounds of discovery-make daily judgments are increasingly in-
hospitable to calm and reasoned analysis. Each individual lawyer can
be seen as a decision-making system in a fragile equilibrium, balancing
internal drives and standards against countervailing external and envi-
ronmental forces that seem to be gathering strength.
CONCLUSION
It is important to note that this project did not aim to measure the
magnitude of problems facing the world of large-firm litigators,
whether at a level of crisis or otherwise. Indeed, the definition of the
"problem," if any, was itself a significant phase of the discussion in the
early going. Moreover, the extent to which there is a problem to be
solved depends largely on the lens through which the data is viewed.
If measured by violations of clear rules regulating lawyers, most of the
researchers accepted the participants' views that, notwithstanding re-
cent highly publicized cases and the reality that much conduct of this
sort is undetected, such deviance is rare in large law firms. 4 When
the frame shifts, however, to the broader landscape of discretionary
competitive acts that, while arguably within the rules, are suppressive
of truth in civil litigation or costly in human terms, the picture is dif-
ferent, with controversial conduct more widespread. There is no con-
sensus as to what constitutes questionable conduct within this range,
as the range itself is a reflection of our adversary system and its inde-
terminate partisanship norms.
As to the larger picture of how the current landscape measures up,
reactions ranged from rejection of the claim of crisis, citing the cyclical
and possibly political nature of such claim of crisis and the overall
32. See Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Eve-
ryday Ethics of Defense Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 739, 746-47 (1998); Nelson,
supra note 25, at 780-81
33. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 730-31.
34. The informants down-played the extent of the problem of clear ethical lapses,
surmising that the perception of an increased problem could be attributed to the in-
crease in the sheer number of lawyers and thus of "bad apples," the heightened jour-
nalistic interest in law practice, and the fact that firms no longer protect deviant
colleagues from publicity.
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satisfaction of our participants,35 to viewing lawyers' problems as
symptomatic of larger societal trends,36 to guarded pessimism about
the future in face of changing external pressures. 7 While no one was
prepared to sound an alarm, all sensed that the trends and the ways
our participants talked were not encouraging.
35. See Sarat, supra note 28, at 809-10; Suchman, supra note 26, at 874.
36. See Messikomer, supra note 32, at 768.
37. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 781-85, 791-92.
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